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REPORT 
Number 29--December 1979 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
Milk Regulation in Montana 
LI BR ARY 
by 
William 0. Bronson* 
Government price control is an old institution. If often 
has been supported by businessmen eager to escape the 
discipline of the free market as well as by public officials 
determined to reestablish order in chaotic economies. 
Generally, the achievements of public price-fixing have been 
dismal. Gross inequities and inefficiencies stemming from 
controls tend to mar the operation of an economic system. 
During the Fourth Century A.D., the Roman Emperor 
Diocletian's mammoth attempt at price regulation brought 
his empire to the brink of financial and social ruin. More 
recently, President Richard Nixon's program to stifle the 
nation's inflationary spiral with wage and price restraints 
only made a healty recovery more difficult. 
Montana's forty-four year experience with milk price 
regulation has not proven as harrowing as the trials of 
Diocletian and Nixon. It has, however, provoked enough 
controversy to warrant a critical analysis by policy makers. 
This report addresses several questions concerning the past 
activities of, and future options for, government supervision 
of the dairy industry in Montana. 
Early History of Regulation 
The Great Depression had a devastating impact on 
Montana's prosperous dairy industry. To meet falling 
consumer demand, milk dealers engaged in frantic price 
cutting and givea:way schemes to attract customers. 
Producers faced the fact that raw milk is highly perishable 
and must be marketed promptly. Public health officials 
worried that cost-conscious producers and processors 
would cut corners too sharply and jeopardize the quality of 
milk products. By 1934, milk industry representatives, 
government officials, and some concerned citizens decided 
that a free market was riot a suitable arrangement for 
producing and distributing dairy products. 
After a brief but unsuccessful attempt at self-regulation of 
industry practices under New Deal price codes, dairymen 
decided to lobby for government controls. Strong bipartisan 
support assured the passage of the first Milk Control Act in 
1935. A three-member board was granted temporary 
emergency powers to set and enforce prices that would cover 
production costs and help assure suitable profit margins in 
the industry. In 1939, the milk lobby convinced lawmakers 
that the temporary arrangement · should be made 
permanent. A new five-member board, heavily weighted 
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with industry representatives, was created and given 
stronger price-fixing authority. 
Economic order returned to the dairy industry by the 
mid l 940's. It is difficult to say whether regulation or the war 
economy was primarily responsible for the recovery. The 
board was aggressive in extending price controls to most 
areas of the state. Dairymen were united in their support of 
board activities. 
By the late l 950's there wete indications that milk 
regulation was a shambles. Tension between economic 
transformation of the industry and administration of the 
milk control law had reached a critical stage. When the law 
was first implemented, most dairy farmers produced, 
processed, and distributed their own milk, and producers, 
producer-distributors, and distributors each were entitled to 
one seat on.the milk board. By the l 950's the old distributor 
operation was being replaced by separate production and 
processing-marketing firms, although producer-distributors 
were still entitled to board representation. The Montana 
Dairy Producers Association argued that the allocation of 
seats on the board was now weighted in favor of distributor 
interests. Similarly retail trade associations: noting that 
their members were picking up a greater share of consumer 
sales when compared with direct home delivery; argued for 
representation on the board. 
1957 Legislative Investigation 
These arguments spawned a special legislative 
investigation of the industry and the board in early 1957. A 
joint, select committee uncovered evidence not only of 
inadequacies in existing law but also instances of failure to 
administer the law properly. The extreme perishability of 
milk still kept producers within a "sell quickly or dump" 
squeeze, and this problem was 'sometimes aggravated by 
unscrupulous distributors · who bullied producers and 
cheated them on purchase reports. A common trick was to 
inform producers that their raw milk was destined for 
production of ice cream, cheese, or animal feed. The price 
paid to producers for these purposes was uncontrolled and 
therefore set at the. discretion of distributors. Some 
distributors would deliberately set low prices for the raw 
milk, process it for drinking purposes, and sell it at the 
higher, uncontrolled price. The profit gained by this 
unethical transaction was hard to uncover, since reporting 
requirements under the law were weak and lacked 
uniformity. 
The investigating committee also determined that the 
board and its staff were often incompetent, indecisive, or 
deliberately unfair when administering the law. One shrewd 
board member, who represented milk distributors, had used 
his position to some business colleagues' advantage. Prices 
affecting producers had not been adjusted for years, and 
there were strong suspicions of "behind-closed-doors" deals 
between industry representatives and board members. One 
source close to the dairy industry summed up the situation 
by claiming that economic events and regulatory powers 
were almost completely at the disposal of distributors and to 
the detriment of producers and the public. 
The report of the committee came too late in the 
legislative session to instigate a comprehensive reform 
package. Legislators and the governor settled, temporarily, 
for two cosmetic changes - revising the allocation of seats 
on the board to give producers more clout, and appointing 
new individuals to the restructured board. Between 
legislative sessions, representatives from all segments of the 
industry grudgingly agreed to compromise their differences 
and clean their own house, lest the legislature repeal the 
entire law. Lobbyists eventually produced a reform bill 
which strengthened reporting requirements and tempered 
other inadequacies of the law. The most striking innovation 
was the proviso that only consumers could sit on the new 
five-member board. Supposedly, public members would 
supervise dairy industry practices impartially. The 1959 
legislature adopted this compromise, perhaps hoping that 
this episode would conclude the controversial history of the 
Milk Control Board. 
Current Criticism of Regulation 
Producers and distributors have continued to war with 
one another over the structure of milk price regulation, 
although the producers' position has improved remarkably 
since 1959. In recent years, controversy has shifted in the 
direction of consumer antagonism against the board. 
Recent public opm10n surveys indicate significant 
resentment over frequent increases in the price of fluid milk. 
Several individuals have publicly argued for the 
abandonment of controls and elimination of the Milk 
Control Board. Ironically, these criticisms come at a time 
when the board is required by law to give considerable 
weight to consumer opinion and purchasing power, and has, 
in fact, made sincere attempts to carry out these provisions. 
The widespread sentiment that prices are needlessly high 
and reflect industry influence is supported by empirical 
studies. The Montana Legislative Auditor's report on price 
control, published in 1976, sharply criticized the 
consequences of controlling retail and wholesale prices in 
the dairy industry. (Wholesale prices are the charges paid to 
processor-distributors by retail outlets.) Some board 
members also have publicly voiced these concerns. 
High on the list of complaints is the large distributor gross 
margin (DGM). The DGM is the difference between what 
distributors pay producers for milk and the retail price. 
Montana's DG M is considerably higher than those of 
adjacent and similar states and it exceeds California's 
average by 47 percent. Critics also focus on net profit 
margins (profit as a percentage of net equity) for milk 
distributors. Montana's average is approximately 18 
percent, whereas the national average is about eight percent. 
Contrary to industry views, the high margins are not due to 
transportation costs. Rather, they reflect inefficiences in 
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processing and marketing that generally do not exist under 
competitive conditions. For example, fluid milk is almost 
always sold at the same price regardless of whether it is 
'brought directly to your home or obtained from the 
supermarket, and whether it is sold in plastic or paper 
containers. 
Another criticism leveled against controls is that retailers 
rarely price their milk above the minimum charge specified 
py the board. The board does not set maximum prices. Since 
the minimum price is normally used regardless of location 
_and transportation costs, critics believe that the board may 
be overpricing milk. Critics also point to lower milk prices in 
similar states and on federal installations not covered by 
state law, noting that reasonable profits can apparently be 
made under competitive arrangements. 
Estimates of consumer demand for milk priced under 
government control suggest that over a period of years 
overpricing has probably led to smaller milk purchases by 
the public than would have been made in a competitive 
market. This has the consequence of cutting down the 
income of dairy producers and channeling overpayments 
into the processing-distribution sector. It is consequently 
argued -that the Milk Control Act has great potential for 
wrecking, not salvaging, much of the dairy industry. 
Producer price controls have not come under much fire. 
Many . economists believe that dairy farmers produce a 
unique commodity under severe biological and economic 
constraints. While some measure of price protection has 
been supported, there also is fear that too much protection 
may act as a disincentive. High incomes generated by price 
controls can induce and protect inefficient productior, 
methods, something not in the interest of consumers. 
The Milk Control Board has recognized some of these 
problems in recent years and has attempted to correct them 
through the administrative process. Proposals to adjust 
pricing formulas in 1976 and 1978 would have had the 
indirect effect of generating competition and reducing some 
profit margins in the industry. At the request of distributors. 
both proposals were overturned in district court. A more 
ambitious plan to make price increases less frequent and to 
lower excess profits in the distribution sector recently has 
been adopted in part. There is no indication whether dairy 
lobbyists will challenge this modification in the courts. The 
frustrations experienced by the board in recent years, 
combined with the evidence reviewed, have convinced some 
board members that only deregulation of wholesale and 
retail prices will best serve the public interest. The board, 
however, does not have authority to suspend controls. 
Arguments of the Industry 
The dairy industry has successfully resisted efforts to 
weaken the regulatory structure, although arguments 
in favor of continuing the status quo have changed 
somewhat over time. Today, milk dealers are more 
concerned about monopolization of their industry · should 
controls be abolished. Distributors fear that without price 
protection the largest distributors - including one major 
chain grocery store which processes and sells its own brand 
- will deliberately slash prices in order to steal customers 
from economically weaker firms. Many distributors would 
be forced to quit because of "cutthroat" competition, and 
there would be a domino effect on producer-suppliers. The 
market eventually would regain equilibrium with, say, only 
one or two distributors, fewer producers, and higher, 
monopoly prices for milk products. Some dealers predict 
even more dire results. They see financial disaster extending 
to so many Montana dairymen that out-of-state suppliers, 
charging extremely high prices, would be necessary to meet 
consumer demand. In short, many dairymen conclude that 
controls preserve, rather than destroy competition. 
From both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, the 
above arguments are rather specious. The distribution end 
of the Montana dairy industry already is an oligopoly; a few 
firms operate in a market where each firm's pricing activities 
are highly interrelated and sensitive. Oligopolies tend 
toward price stability. Because one firm's price-cutting action 
would only provoke the same by other firms, a no-win 
situation becomes evident. Extreme price-cutting is rare. 
Similarly, no one firm could raise prices without its 
competitors attracting the firm's customers by keeping their 
prices stable. Unless the firms act in concert, increases 
cannot be maintained. Action of this kind constitutes price-
fixing and is illegal under federal and state law. In addition, 
price gouging designed to eliminate competition is unlawful 
and can command stiff penalties. Several Montana 
distributors did engage in illegal price-fixing in the mid-
I 960's and were fined accordingly. However, this should not 
be an excuse for substituting inefficient price controls for 
antitrust enforcement. With the additional provision of a 
posting requirement, whereby all firms "post" their prices 
regularly with regulatory agencies, any possibility of deviant 
price behavior by oligopolies can be controlled. 
One should not ignore the fact that development of 
oligopoly in the distribution business and decline in the 
number of dairy farms have taken place during a period of 
state regulation. One individual close to the industry has 
privately described the distribution network as a shared 
monopoly. In April 1979, two firms alone controlled 57 
percent of fluid milk distribution. Another dramatic 
development is the reduction in the number of dairy farmers 
over the past forty years. Even price control cannot protect 
grossly inefficient operation. 
The experience of several states with resale price 
deregulation serves as a counterweight to industry fears of 
monopoly control. Many distributors in these states have 
stayed in business when competition forced them to 
innovate. Many dairy producers have also continued to 
thrive. Frequently, departure from the industry is the result 
of carelessness and not deregulation. A Federal Trade 
Commission report suggests that states like Montana with a 
small population and large territory could sustain several 
small and medium-level dairy operations due to location 
and transportation advantages not always present in smaller 
or more population-dense regions. Deregulation in 
Montana would not likely be a cure worse than the disease. 
Past Reform Attempts 
Before considering a workable alternative to the existing 
Milk Control Act, it is important to mention possible 
avenues to reform. There have been several attempts to alter 
significantly the regulatory structure in Montana, and each 
has been fraught with booby-traps. 
Some critics have sought a judicial opinion declaring 
price regulation unconstitutional. The Montana Supreme 
Court made it clear in Milk Control Board v. Rehberg 
( 1962) that it would not make substantive judgments about 
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the economic worth of price controls; this was and remains a 
legislative prerogative. Although high courts in three states 
have ruled that milk price controls violate private property 
and due process rights, these decisions were based on · a 
substantive due process doctrine frowned on by most courts, 
including Montana's. 
Legislators bent on reform .also have not had much 
success. Several proposals to eliminate controls or give the 
board freedom to establish differentials in pricing have been 
quashed at the committee stage since 1937. Although two 
deregulation bills finally survived House committee review 
in 1979, they died on the floor by two-to-one margins. Dairy 
producers, distributors, and retailers are well organized and 
have weight in legislative circles. 
Consumers are not well organized and their viewpoints 
are not widely disseminated and considered. Proponents of 
regulation use this vacuum to assert that the public is not 
really concerned about milk prices. The plausibility of this 
argument must be challenged. Consumerism, in the jargon 
of economists, is a "public good." The costs of achieving 
consumer goals - hiring lobbyists, appearing to present 
testimony, taking time away from job or home - are 
enormous to one individual and are typically shoved upon 
one's neighbor, who in turn passes the burden, and so on. 
Unless costs are shared to reduce individual burdens, public 
goals cannot be easily expressed or achieved. 
An organized public effort will be necessary to change the 
milk control law, but convincing legislators to make the 
change also will require a thorough understanding of 
political realities. Not all Republican legislators can be 
expected to support deregulation, even though their party 
generally advocates the free market concept. Many 
Republicans represent rural areas and share constituents' 
fears that decontrol will hurt the local economy. Rural 
Democrats often find themselves in a similar situation. 
Other lawmakers have not been able to sort out the 
fallacious arguments made by industry lobbyists. To date, 
only urban-liberal Democrats and a few urban Republicans 
have publicly supported deregulation. A legislative change 
in the Act will come only when. urban, and some rural, 
legislators are convinced that the available evidence 
supports deregulation as a more equitable public policy. 
Some reformers have considered the initiative process as a 
substitute for slow and stubborn legislative machinery. 
Deregulation may be so controversial that only a popular 
vote can settle the issue; the table wine initiative of 1978 is a 
good example. However, the language of an initiative may 
be so poorly structured that unintended interpretations and 
legislative backlash result. An alternative to legislation or an 
initiative is to rely on the existing board to meet public 
preferences, but this process can be easily manipulated by 
the dairy industry. The administrative hearing process is a 
lawyer's paradise. Unorganized or seemingly 
"unprofessional" consumer views are easy targets in such a 
setting; substantive arguments are often derailed by 
procedural technicalities. 
Conclusion 
When judged by many of its aims, the Montana Milk 
Control Act has been a failure. It has promoted several 
economic inefficiencies damaging to the industry and the 
public. It cannot prevent the closure of many milk dealers, 
but it has potential for granting undue political and 
economic advantage, especially to the processing and 
distribution sectors. Despite the consumer orientation of the 
present board, the absence of broad public partidpation and 
the limits of the law allow free play to industry pressures. 
The feeling of some regulators that the Administrative 
Procedures Act unfairly limits speedy and effective action 
by the board for everyone's benefit is well-taken, but the 
prospect of an administrative agency operating without 
consistent and equitable procedures is an undesirable 
alternative. Besides, this concern does not address the 
underlying difficulties of regulation. 
If any public interest can be identified concerning milk 
regulation it is that Montanans would be better served by 
deregulation of prices at the retail and wholesale levels. A 
program to this end could be instituted gradually under 
legislative guidelines. Considering the power of several 
distributors, · it may be politically wise to allow the Milk 
Control Board discretion to reimplement controls on a 
temporary basis in marketing areas experiencing chaotic 
conditions. If this power is granted, it should be exercised 
only with extreme caution by the board. The potential for 
abuse of this power is great because of inevitable presence of 
strong and selfish interests. Although a good case can be 
made for retaining controls on producer pricers, it would be 
wiser over the long run to suspend them in conjunction with 
establishment of cooperative processing and/ or marketing 
arrangements. A program of this kind would allow 
producers to maintain their farms while allowing them to 
take advantage of economies of scale available from 
cooperative enterprise. Diffusion of economic power should 
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make monopolization of political influence less probable. 
The state also should apply a vigorous antitrust policy 
(includipg posting of prices) to the dairy industry, rather 
than acquiescing in the misconception that price controls 
preserve competition. Montana has machinery for this task 
in the Department of Justice's Antitrust Enforcement 
Bureau. However, the legislature will have to beef up the 
Bureau's budget. This will require convincing some 
legislators that antitrust policy would deal more effectively 
with anti-competitive practices than a regulatory program 
which does more to hide these practices than control them. 
It cannot be overemphasized that organized consumer 
activity will be necessary to achieve much of the stated 
program, regardless of whether it is achieved legislatively or 
through popular initiative. Policy makers, dairymen, and 
the public should take note that the Federal Trade 
Commission has recently demonstrated a willingness to 
overturn state laws which countenance monopoly rather 
than protect the citizenry. Montanans may soon have to 
decide whether they should clean their own house before 
"Big Brother" in Washington extends a helping, but possibly 
unwelcome, hand. 
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